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A B S T R A C T
This study examines how state subsidies to firms affect corporate investment efficiency. Using
archival data from a sample of Chinese listed firms over the 2007–2015 period, we find that
government subsidies have a negative effect on firms' investment efficiency, and this negative
effect is more pronounced for firms that are less financially constrained. Further analyses suggest
that government subsidies are positively associated with firms' over-investment, although they
alleviate under-investment. Our findings are robust to a series of tests to alleviate concerns about
potential endogeneity and self-selection bias.
1. Introduction
Governments subsidise business sectors to promote economic growth, offset market imperfections, develop economies of scale
and meet social policy objectives (e.g. Schwartz and Clements, 1999). At country or industry levels, government subsidies can affect
operational efficiency (Dube, 2003; Kebede, 2006), production capacity (Cotti and Skidmore, 2010), research and development
activities (Gorg and Strobl, 2006; Liu and Shieh, 2005), employment (Girma et al., 2008) and export competitiveness (Desai and
Hines, 2008). At the firm level, government subsidies have been found to influence firm value (Bar-Yosef and Landskroner, 1988; Lee
et al., 2014), firm performance (Balsari and Ucdogruk, 2008), firm productivity (BergstrÖm, 2000; Harris and Trainor, 2005) and
voluntary social and responsibility disclosures (Lee et al., 2017). Our study adds to this literature by investigating the effect of
government subsidies on corporate investment efficiency. In doing so, we explore the effect of subsidies on corporate over- and under-
investment, and the moderating effect of the recipients' financial constraints.
Government subsidies are widespread in China and have the primary goal of promoting the development of strategic industrial
sectors such as agriculture, public utilities and high-tech industries (Chen et al., 2008). The government also provides subsidies to
firms to alleviate capital constraints and support firms in financial difficulties (Claro, 2006; Lee et al., 2014). The amount of the
subsidies is often at the discretion of local governments and varies significantly between subsidised firms (Lee et al., 2014). As
subsidies are highly discretionary, and there is a lack of systematic reporting and monitoring of the utility of subsidies in China
(Zhang et al., 2014), little is known about the effect of subsidies on corporate investment efficiency. Chinese local governments
provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings for rights issues and avoid delisting (Chen et al., 2008).1 He (2016) finds that
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subsides help firms achieve their desired earnings targets for IPO purposes. Both of these studies find opportunistic use of government
subsidies by Chinese listed firms, and thereby cast doubt on the efficiency of subsidies. These results are the motivation for our
research. Our inquiry is also motivated by the scarcity of research on government subsidies at the firm level, although there are many
studies of their macro-economic effects at the country and industry levels (e.g. Schwartz and Clements, 1999; Stiglitz, 1993; (Bagwell
and Staiger, 1989; Claro, 2006; Lopez and Galinato, 2007; Neary, 1994).
Using archival data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2015, we conduct a batch of analyses of corporate investment
efficiency. After controlling for determinants of investment efficiency identified in previous studies, we find that in general, subsidies
adversely affect corporate investment efficiency. Furthermore, we define investment inefficiency in terms of over- and under-in-
vestment, and then test the effects of subsidies on over- versus under-investment. The results suggest that subsidies exacerbate over-
investment but alleviate under-investment, suggesting that subsidies create a tendency to waste financial resources on unprofitable
projects – a manifestation of over-investment. This finding is in accordance with the evidence for over-investment by Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) due to their soft budgets and inadequate supervision (e.g. Bai & Lian, 2013). SOEs also have significant
advantages in receiving government subsidies thanks to their ownership ties with the government (Bajona & Chu, 2010; Eckaus,
2006). In addition, the results support our proposition that the inefficient use of subsidies is more severe in firms with abundant
financial resources than in firms where financial resources are constrained, indicating that subsidies granted to financially sufficient
firms can induce inefficiency. These results hold after we conduct a set of robustness analyses to alleviate concerns about endogeneity
and self-selection bias. Collectively, our research sheds light on how government financial aid influences firms' investment efficiency
in China, where government intervention in the economy and business is pervasive.
Our study makes a number of key contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to
examine the effect of government subsidies on investment efficiency at the firm level. Although government subsidies have been
found to have a substantial macro-economic impact on country and industry level operational efficiency, production capacity, and
firm value and profitability, the mechanisms through which the effects take place are largely unexplored. Our study distinguishes
itself from previous studies by delving into the effect of subsidies on corporate investment efficiency and thus providing micro-
economic evidence for the effect of government subsidies on corporate investment inefficiency. Therefore, the results provide a
potential explanation for subsidies' effect on firm-, industry- and country-level economic performance.
Second, previous studies of the effects of government subsidies are inconclusive (Bagwell and Staiger, 1989; Claro, 2006). Some
studies have found that government subsidies can be value-enhancing, whereas others suggest that they foster inefficiency. Our study
identifies a potential moral hazard for subsidy recipients: subsidies can encourage over-investment resulting in investment in-
efficiency, and this effect is more pronounced for firms that are less financially constrained. Hence, our findings have practical
implications for governments in terms of the need to prioritise subsidy recipients based on their financial conditions and to monitor
the utility of subsidies. Third, our sample of Chinese data offers a rich insight into the Chinese context. The use of subsidies is
widespread and crucial to business success in China. Compared with their counterparts in the US, many Chinese firms have received
government subsidies.2 With a large sample of firms taken from an archival dataset, we provide credible evidence that is informative
for other countries, because subsidies are common economic transactions practised by governments in most countries.3
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops testable hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the research design, followed by Section 4 which presents the main test results and robustness analyses. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and the development of hypotheses
2.1. Literature review and institutional background
Government subsidies shape domestic resource allocation decisions, income distribution, expenditure productivity, structural and
sectoral adjustment, and international resource allocation affected by subsidy recipients' international competitiveness (Schwartz and
Clements, 1999). Whether government subsidies are a necessary mechanism for economic adjustment and whether they are bene-
ficial or detrimental to a free-market economy are contentious issues.
Proponents of government subsidies argue that government subsidies are applied around the world to overcome market im-
perfections, exploit economies of scale and promote social policies (e.g. (Schwartz and Clements, 1999; Stiglitz, 1993). Opponents
argue that subsidies are often ineffective (i.e. they fail to benefit the recipients) and costly (i.e. they have adverse real welfare and
distributional implications). They further argue that subsidies result in an inefficient allocation of resources and deadweight losses if
they are imposed on a competitive market: ‘Subsidies lead to overproduction of the subsidised good, since production and con-
sumption are expanded beyond the point where the marginal social benefit of consuming the good are equal to or greater than the
marginal social costs of production’ (Schwartz and Clements, 1999, pp. 129–130). Empirical research provides mixed results re-
garding the consequences of state subsidies around the world. Some studies suggest that such subsidies are beneficial (Bagwell and
2 For instance, our sample shows that 70% of Chinese listed firms in 2013 received government subsidies. This is much higher than the 10% in the
study by Pappas et al. (2017) using US data. Specifically, Pappas et al. (2017) start the sample with 59,285 firm-year observations, and show that
only about 10% of the initial sample, 5878 firm-year observations, received subsidies.
3 Government subsidies are so common that there is a specific International Accounting Standard, IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and
Disclosure of Government Assistance, dedicated to reporting subsidies.
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Staiger, 1989; Claro, 2006), whereas others infer that they are detrimental due to the resulting overproduction or efficiency losses at
the macro-economic level (Lopez and Galinato, 2007; Neary, 1994).
In developed economies like the US, subsidies through non-tax channels, such as direct tax injections, loan guarantees and debt
forgiveness, are based on competitive applications (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). In contrast, in the Chinese political economy,
subsidies are also driven significantly by political influence (Haley and Haley, 2013) and are largely determined at the discretion of
officials based on the political connectedness of firms (Chen et al., 2008; Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). During China's economic
liberalisation process, the political system has become highly decentralised, giving local governments autonomy within their jur-
isdictions (You and Du, 2012). This decentralisation has generated strong inter-jurisdictional competition incentives between local
governments (Xu, 2011). To increase regional GDP, local governments have strong incentives to support local firms. Granting
subsidies to improve local listed firms' reported earnings, cash flow and competitiveness is one of the strategies commonly used by
local governments (Chen et al., 2008).
Government subsidies are scarce resources not available to all listed firms. Local governments have discretion over the size and
recipients of subsidies, setting and changing eligibility criteria based on their objectives (Aschhoff, 2008). In China, government
subsidies often include treasury direct subsidies, value-added tax (VAT) refunds, corporate income tax refunds, technology and
innovation grants, etc. Direct subsidies, such as cash payments and loan guarantees, are the focus of this study, because they are non-
tax-based subsidies allocated in a relatively discretionary manner by local governments (Lee et al., 2014).4
A few Chinese studies provide valuable insights into the firm-level determinants of receiving subsidies and the consequences of
subsidies. To investigate the determinants of subsidies, Lee et al. (2014) interview government officials, accountants, entrepreneurs,
academics and analysts. Their interview-based evidence suggests that one important determinant is the existence of personal con-
nections (or guanxi) between entrepreneurs and officials. Wu and Cheng (2011) argue that managers with political connections may
influence the government subsidies decision-making process by lobbying policymakers. In addition, managers with prior political
experience are familiar with government procedures and preferences and are thus able to predict government resource allocation
priorities. This insight, in turn, provides the connected firms with greater opportunities to receive government funding than their
counterparts without political connections. A recent paper by Jiang et al. (2018) reports that Chinese firms tend to manipulate
earnings downwards to compete for government subsidies; however, the market discounts the ‘good news’ of subsidies received by
firms that have conducted such downward earnings management.
In terms of consequences, studies show that local governments may opportunistically give subsidies to help firms boost their
earnings for rights issues and to avoid delisting5 (Chen et al., 2008). As political connections are often used to secure government
subsidies (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Lee et al., 2014), Wu and Cheng (2011) argue that due to the role of political favours, subsidies
may generate incentives for firms to take actions that are not economically desirable for the firms. In addition, although studies reveal
that government subsidies are relevant to market value (Lee et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2018), the market appears to understand firms'
opportunism in pursuing subsidies and thus ‘punishes’ firms receiving subsidies through inappropriate means by discounting their
share prices (Jiang et al., 2018). In addition, a recent study reports that subsidies granted by the Chinese government to firms are
negatively related to firm performance (Bu et al., 2017). We take a different approach to the consequences of subsidies, focusing on
investment efficiency as a mechanism through which government subsidies affect firms' economic performance.
Investment efficiency allows firms to increase shareholders' wealth over the long run, because investment in profitable projects results
in positive returns that support the firms' long-term growth. In the neoclassical framework, the marginal Q ratio is the sole driver of capital
investment policy (e.g. (Abel, 1983; Hayashi, 1982; Yoshikawa, 1980). Firms invest at the equilibrium point where the marginal benefit of
capital investment equals the marginal cost after taking into account the adjustment costs of installing the new capital. Firms obtain
financing for positive net present value projects evaluated with the economy-wide interest rate and then return excess cash to investors
(Biddle et al., 2009). However, it is recognised that firms may depart from this optimal level and either over- or under-invest, resulting in
investment inefficiency. Previous studies have identified two primary drivers of investment inefficiency: moral hazard and adverse se-
lection. Moral hazard arises when managers invest to maximise their personal welfare rather than shareholders' interests (Berle and Means,
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), whereas adverse selection is caused by information asymmetry between managers and outside sup-
pliers of capital, which affects the efficiency of capital investment. When there is divergence in principal-agent incentives, managers will
invest in negative net present value projects as a manifestation of moral hazard. Although moral hazard can result in either over- or under-
investment based on the availability of capital, the natural tendency to over-invest will produce excess investment if firms have resources to
invest. Jensen (1986) also predicts that managers have incentives to grow their firms beyond the optimal size.
4 A VAT refund is less likely to be manipulated, as it is not subject to local government administration. The aim of the tax-based subsidies is to
encourage the development of certain industries, businesses and prioritised regions (Lee et al., 2014; He, 2016). Only firms located in special
economic zones, or operating in industries prioritised by the government, are entitled to receive tax-based subsidies. Previous studies (Chen et al.,
2008; Lee et al., 2014; He, 2016) suggest that tax refunds (and technology and innovation grants) provide little discretion for local governments.
5 The CSRC uses bright-line regulatory benchmarks to grant approvals for IPOs and rights offerings and to initiate performance-related delisting.
The CSRC has set and changed the standards required for listed firms to issue right shares quite frequently over the years. In 1993, firms were
required to have only two consecutive years of profits before they could issue rights. In September 1994, the CSRC specified, for the first time, that a
firm must have an average ROE of more than 10% in the previous three years before it could issue rights. In January 1996, the CSRC toughened this
requirement, stating that a firm must have more than 10% ROE for each of the previous three years. CSRC then lowered the standard in March 1999,
requiring that firms have an average ROE above 10% in the past three years but not lower than 6% in any of these years. In March 2001, CSRC
further lowered the standard, stating that firms must have an average ROE above 6% in the past three years. Chinese listed firms have an incentive to
manage reported earnings to meet these specific performance benchmarks (Piotroski & Wong, 2012).
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2.2. Hypotheses development
Government subsidies help firms to overcome capital constraints (Claro, 2006; Li, 2002). If subsidies are granted to firms with
good investment opportunities, the firms will have more capital to pursue investment projects that have positive net present value
(NPV). As a result, firms' investment efficiency improves. However, in the case of government officials allocating subsidies to boost or
rescue poorly performing firms, and/or subsidy recipients investing in negative net present value projects as a result of managers'
moral hazard, subsidies will be used inappropriately, which can result in the misallocation of subsidies to unprofitable projects,
leading to investment inefficiency.
Given the opportunism associated with the granting and receiving subsidies, but also the potential benefits associated with using
subsidies to increase shareholders' value, it is unclear whether the financial resources supplied by subsidies are invested in profitable
projects. Therefore, we provide our first hypothesis in the null form.
H1. Corporate investment efficiency is significantly associated with government subsidies.
We are also interested in whether the effect of subsidies on firms' investment efficiency differs between over- and under-in-
vestment. It is believed that there is an optimal level of investment in firms that must be maintained to ensure investment efficiency
(Biddle, 2009). Therefore, we test the effect of subsidies on both the over- and the under-investment of firms. We posit a differential
effect of subsidies on over- and under-investment. Firms with abundant cash flow tend to over-invest (Jensen, 1986; Myers, 1977).
When moral hazard occurs among the managers of a subsidy recipient, the investments conducted with the abundant cash flow
provided by the subsidy may exceed the optimal level of investment, resulting in over-investment. In contrast, the financial assistance
provided through subsidies to firms with limited financial resources makes them less likely to be constrained by cash flow, and thus
reduces the probability of under-investment. Taken together, we posit that subsidy recipients will use the injected cash flow to over-
spend rather than under-spend, and thus we hypothesise that government subsidies have a positive (negative) relationship with over-
investment (under-investment), as stated in Hypothesis 2.
H2. Government subsidies are positively associated with over-investment, but negatively associated with under-investment.
We next exploit some cross-sectional variation in the effect of government subsidies on investment inefficiency (over- or under-
investment). Specifically, we are interested in the moderating effect of firms' financial constraints. We expect the effect of government
subsidies on corporate investment efficiency to be conditional on the recipients' financial constraints. Financial assistance is highly
sought after by firms with financial difficulties, because extra cash flow can alleviate their financial constraints. Government sub-
sidies provide firms with an interest free cash flow that is particularly helpful for overcoming temporary credit crunches. Girma et al.
(2007) investigate whether Irish government subsidies stimulate productivity growth. They find that government subsidies produce
greater increases in productivity in companies with financing constraints. Therefore, we conjecture that although financially con-
strained firms may be more likely to invest in projects that are value-enhancing, which improves investment efficiency, extra cash
injections into firms with sufficient financial resources may encourage wasteful investments, thus reducing investment efficiency.
Accordingly, we develop the following hypothesis.
H3. The effect of government subsidies on investment efficiency is conditional on the financial constraints of the subsidy recipients.
3. Research design
3.1. Sample and data
The analyses are conducted with a sample of A-share non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in
the 2007 to 2015 period. The data on subsidies are retrieved from WIND, a leading Chinese financial and economics database. We
obtain all of the financial and stock market data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. This
sample consists of 12,431 firm-year observations. We begin our sample in 2007 because the new Chinese Accounting Standards
(CAS), which converge with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), were implemented in this year.
3.2. Model specification
Following previous studies of corporate investment efficiency (e.g. (Beatty et al., 2010; Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013), we
test our hypotheses by estimating the following equation using unbalanced panel data:
= + + + × + + + +
+ + + + + +
+
+
Invest Subsidy Q Q Subsidy CFO Size Lev Tangile
IPOage ARET ROE IMR Industry and Year Fixed Effects ,
j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t j t
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , , 1 (1)
where Invest is the sum of capital expenditures including net investment in property, plant, and equipment, intangibles and other
long-term assets reported on the Statement of Cash Flow, deflated by lagged total assets. Q is Tobin's Q, which is a proxy for growth
opportunities. Q is measured as the sum of market value and total liability divided by total assets. Subsidy is the amount of gov-
ernment subsidies reported under the non-operating income on the Statement of Financial Performance, deflated by total assets.
Following Biddle et al. (2009) and Richardson (2006), the model controls for the following variables in year t that may affect the level
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of investment in the following year: CFO, Size, Lev, Tangibl, IPOage, ARET and ROE. Industry and year fixed effects dummies are
included. Standard errors are clustered by firms to control for potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and to provide robust
standard error estimations with reliable t-statistics (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009).
To further examine the differential effect of subsidies on over- and under-investment, as stated in Hypothesis 2, we first estimate
the optimal level of investment and then define over- and under-investment. Based on the theory that investment increases with
operating income (e.g.Biddle et al., 2009; Modigliani and Miller, 1958), we first estimate the optimal level of investment using the
model defined in Eq. (2), which is drawn from Chen et al. (2011):
= + + + × + ++ +Invest Neg RevGrowth Neg RevGrowth Industry and Year Fixed Effects ,j t j t j t j t j t j t, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , , 1 (2)
where NEG is 1 if last year's operating income growth rate is negative, and 0 otherwise. RevGrowth is the percentage change in sales
from year t-1 to year t. Eq. (2) is estimated for each industry-year, and the parameters estimated are used to calculate the residual for
each firm-year observation. We further define two variables for over-investment (Over_Invest) and under-investment (Under_Invest).
Over_Invest takes the value of the residual if it is positive, and 0 otherwise. In contrast, Under_Invest takes the value of the residual if
the residual is negative, and 0 otherwise. Then, we test Hypothesis 2 using Eq. (3), where Over_Invest or Under_Invest are regressed on
subsidy and a set of control variables, respectively. If H2 is supported, we expect to observe a positive (negative) α1 when Over_Invest
(Under_Invest) is the dependent variable.
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ +
+
Over Under Subsidy Q CFO Size Lev Tangile
IPOage ARET ROE IMR Industry and Year Fixed Effects
/Invest j t Invest j t j t j t j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t j t
, 1 , 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , , 1 (3)
We then examine whether the association between government subsidies and investment efficiency varies with the subsidy
recipients' financial constraints. Two measures of financial constraints are the SA (size ̲ age) index and Altman Z-score. Following
Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we calculate the SA index for each firm-year observation as −0.737× SIZE
+0.043× SIZE2–0.04×AGE, where AGE stands for firm age. The greater the SA score, the more severe the financial constraint. We
directly retrieve the Altman Z-score from the WIND database. A higher Altman Z-score represents a lower level of financial constraint
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics.
Variables Definition N Mean Standard
deviation
25th
Quartile
Median 75th
Quartile
Invest Investment, measured as the sum of capital expenditures
including net investment in PPE, Intangibles and other long-term
assets reported on the Statement of Cash Flow, deflated by lagged
total assets
12,431 0.055 0.049 0.018 0.041 0.077
Q Tobins Q, measured as the sum of market value and total liability
divided by total assets
12,431 2.261 1.306 1.370 1.857 2.683
Subsidy The amount of subsidy deflated by total assets 12,431 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.006
CFO cash flow from operating activities deflated by total assets 12,431 0.051 0.077 0.006 0.049 0.098
Size Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 12,431 21.810 1.171 20.960 21.661 22.473
Lev Leverage, measured as the total liability deflated by total assets 12,431 0.457 0.196 0.305 0.465 0.612
Tangibl Tangible assets, measured as fixed assets deflated by total assets 12,431 0.254 0.163 0.126 0.224 0.360
IPOage Number of years since public listing 12,431 9.534 5.584 4.205 9.545 14.090
ARET Abnormal returns in year t-1 12,431 0.039 0.421 −0.207 −0.024 0.215
ROE Return on equity 12,431 0.079 0.088 0.032 0.074 0.125
Panel B: Correlation Matrix.
Invest Q Subsidy CFO Size LEV Tangibl IPOage ARET ROE
Invest 1
Q 0.047 1
Subsidy 0.084 0.136 1
CFO 0.239 0.118 0.004 1
Size 0.023 −0.442 −0.122 0.060 1
LEV −0.081 −0.369 −0.144 −0.108 0.449 1
Tangibl 0.262 −0.122 −0.015 0.266 0.075 0.101 1
IPOage −0.214 −0.120 −0.130 −0.026 0.255 0.333 0.030 1
ARET 0.022 0.283 0.017 0.067 −0.024 0.026 −0.050 0.004 1
ROE 0.136 0.176 0.030 0.315 0.204 −0.060 −0.129 −0.039 0.150 1
Note: Bold-faced and italicized correlations are significant at p < 0.001 and p < 0.05. Variable definitions are in Panel A of Table 1. Continuous
variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles.
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(Altman, 1968). We then use the median SA or Altman Z-score to partition the full sample into a less financially constrained sub-
sample and a highly financially constrained sub-sample. Then, Eq. (1) is re-estimated for each sub-sample.
4. Empirical findings
4.1. Descriptive statistic and correlations
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Panel A of Table 1 reports that, on average, firms tend to invest
about 5.5% of last year's total assets (Invest), and that subsides (Subsidy) account for 0.4% of the total assets. Firms' average leverage
(Lev) is about 45.7% and the fixed assets account for 25.4% of total assets. The Pearson correlation matrix shown in Panel B of Table 1
shows that investment (Invest) is positively correlated with growth (Q), subsidies (Subsidy), cash flow from operations (CFO), firm size
(Size) and profitability (ROE), but negatively correlated with leverage (Lev) and listing age (IPOage). These correlations are consistent
with the existing literature.
4.2. Main results
The results of Eq. (1) are reported in Table 2. Column (1) of Table 2 reports positive and significant coefficients on Subsidy and Q
for explaining investment (Invest) (coefficients on Subsidy and Q are 1.121 and 0.002, respectively; the t statistics are 5.64 and 3.08,
respectively; both p-values< 1%). These results suggest that subsidies are positively related to firms' level of investment, and firms
with high growth opportunities (Q) have more investments, which is consistent with our theory. The negative coefficient on Q_Subsidy
suggests that subsidies mitigate the positive association between investment (Invest) and growth opportunity (Q) (coefficient is
−0.183; t statistic is −2.83; p-value< 1%). That is, recipients of subsidies tend to reduce investment efficiency. The control vari-
ables show the expected signs, suggesting that firms tend to invest more when they have higher levels of cash flow (CFO), are large
rather than small (Size), have more tangible assets (Tangile) and show a higher profitability (ROE). In contrast, corporate investment
is lower when firms have more debt (Lev) and have been listed for a longer time (IPOage).
To investigate whether the decreasing effect of subsidies on investment efficiency is due to over- or under-investment, we estimate
Eq. (2) to calculate Over_Invest and Under_Invest for each firm-year observation. Then we estimate Eq. (3) with Over_Invest and
Under_Invest as the dependent variables. The results, reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2, show that subsidies have a positive
effect on over-investment (Over_Invest) but a negative effect on under-investment (Under_Invest) (coefficients are 0.294 and−0.237,
respectively; t statistics are 3.48 and −4.92, respectively; both p-values< 1%). These findings suggest that government subsidies
encourage over-investment but mitigate under-investment, supporting Hypothesis 2. In addition, some control variables have
Table 2
The effect of government subsidies on corporate investment efficiency (H1 and H2).
(1) – H1 testing DV: Invest Eq. (1) (2) – H2 testing DV: Over_Invest Eq. (3) (3) – H2 testing DV: Under_Invest Eq. (3)
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept −0.042** −0.027** 0.071***
(−2.54) (−2.36) (10.40)
Subsidy 1.121*** 0.294*** −0.237***
(5.64) (3.48) (−4.92)
Q 0.002*** 0.001** −0.000*
(3.08) (2.17) (−1.73)
Q_Subsidy −0.183*** ̶ ̶
(−2.83) ̶ ̶
CFO 0.074*** 0.049*** −0.009***
(10.62) (9.54) (−3.31)
Size 0.004*** 0.001*** −0.002***
(5.24) (2.83) (−6.92)
Lev −0.009** −0.005* 0.003**
(−2.31) (−1.74) (2.17)
Tangibl 0.040*** 0.019*** −0.012***
(7.62) (5.07) (−5.73)
IPOage −0.002*** −0.001*** 0.000***
(−14.93) (−11.43) (6.97)
ARET 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.90) (0.59) (0.38)
ROE 0.043*** 0.014*** −0.004
(6.81) (2.97) (−1.51)
Year & Industry fixed effects Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 12,431 12,431 12,431
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.198 0.193
Note: The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively
(two-tailed test). Continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are in Table 1.
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opposite relationships with over-investment (Over_Invest) and under-investment (Under_Invest). For instance, cash flow (CFO) is po-
sitively related to Over_Invest but negatively related to Under_Invest. Large firms (Size) are more likely to over-invest, as shown by a
positive relationship with Over_Invest, but are less likely to under-invest, as shown by the negative coefficient on Under_Invest.
We then analyse the moderating effect proposed in Hypothesis 3. To this end, we estimate Eq. (1) for the two sub-samples of firm-
years with strong (weak) financial constraints. The results are reported in Table 3. We find that government subsidies reduce the
investment efficiency of less financially constrained firms, but do not reduce the investment efficiency of firms with strong financial
constraints. Columns (1)–(2) report the results using the median SA score as the criteria, where a high SA score suggests a high level
of financial constraints. The results using the median Altman Z-score as the criteria are reported in columns (3)–(4), where a low
Altman Z-score indicates a high level of financial constraints.
The results in Table 3 show that Subsidy mitigates investment efficiency in the sub-sample of firms with lower levels of financial
constraints, as shown in columns (1) and (3) (coefficients are −0.213 and −0.254, t statistics are −2.54 and −3.29; both p-
values< 1%). However, subsidies do not reduce investment efficiency in firms with high levels of financial constraints, as shown by
the insignificant coefficients on Q_Subsidy for both models reported in columns (2) and (4). These findings indicate that subsidies are
not used efficiently by firms that have relatively easy access to financing, whereas firms facing stronger financial constraints are
unlikely to waste the subsidies. The negative effects of subsidies on corporate investment efficiency are probably due to a two-step
process: when financial resources are abundant, the subsidies contribute to over-investment and thus waste. This highlights the
importance of government scrutiny in subsidy-granting decisions and the necessity of monitoring the efficacy of subsidies at the firm
level.
4.3. Robustness tests
We now consider some robustness tests to alleviate concerns about potential endogeneity between subsidies and corporate in-
vestment efficiency. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that firms with the innate tendency to over-invest actively seek
subsidies (problem of self-selection) or the possibility that certain inherent firm characteristics are correlated with both investment
efficiency and the pursuit of subsidies (omitted variables). If this were the case, our results would be spurious. To alleviate concerns
regarding the self-selection bias and omitted variable problems, we conduct a batch of tests including a two-stage least squares (2SlS)
regression analysis, propensity score matching (PSM) methods and Heckman two-stage regressions. Our results are robust to these
Table 3
The differential effect of subsidies on investment efficiency at low vs. high levels of financial constraints (H3 testing).
DV: Invest (1) (2) (3) (4)
Less financially constrained
firms (SA < median) Eq. (1)
Highly financially
constrained firms (SA > =
median) Eq. (1)
Less financially constrained firms
(Altman Z score > median) Eq.
(1)
Highly financially constrained
firms (Altman Z score= <
median) Eq. (1)
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept −0.038 −0.057** −0.045* −0.081***
(−1.58) (−2.49) (−1.78) (−3.51)
Subsidy 1.145*** 0.975*** 1.464*** 0.458
(4.06) (3.53) (5.06) (0.89)
Q 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.008***
(2.16) (3.38) (2.77) (3.27)
Q_Subsidy −0.213** −0.111 −0.254*** 0.113
(−2.54) (−1.12) (−3.29) (0.37)
CFO 0.088*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.091***
(8.62) (7.15) (5.93) (9.56)
Size 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(3.91) (4.07) (3.73) (5.35)
Lev −0.009 −0.000 −0.007 −0.012**
(−1.59) (−0.06) (−1.15) (−2.02)
Tangibl 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.037***
(6.10) (5.38) (5.58) (5.48)
IPOage −0.003*** −0.001** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−11.98) (−2.57) (−11.91) (−9.56)
ARET 0.002 −0.001 0.002 −0.002
(1.57) (−0.56) (1.21) (−1.57)
ROE 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.049***
(3.91) (5.08) (3.00) (6.55)
Year & Industry
fixed effects
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 6216 6215 6216 6215
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.212 0.239 0.207 0.256
Note: The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-
tailed test). Continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are in Table 1.
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tests, which produce findings that are largely consistent with our main results.
First, in our 2SLS regression, the first-stage regression is conducted with two instrument variables in the form of the industry mean
subsidy in each year and the lagged firm-level subsidy. The results of second-stage regressions that use Eqs. (1) and (3) to test
Hypotheses 1–3 are reported in Table 4. Panel A of Table 4 shows the results of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. Column (1) reports a
consistent negative coefficient on Q_Subsidy, suggesting that subsidies mitigate the positive association between investment and
growth opportunity (Q). Columns (2) and (3) show that subsidies are positively related to over-investment but negatively associated
with under-investment. Panel B of Table 4 shows the differential effect of subsidies on investment efficiency for firms with high (low)
levels of financial constraints. These findings are consistent with our main results, supporting the finding that the negative effect of
subsidies on investment efficiency is more severe for firms that are less financially constrained.
We also conduct Heckman's (1979) two-stage test procedure. The first stage involves the estimation of a probit model where the
dependent variable, defined by whether the firm receives a subsidy, is regressed on a set of firm-specific control variables. These
variables include political connection (PCON),6 number of employees (STAFF),7 operating cash flow (CFO), firm size (Size), leverage
Table 4
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) test to alleviate concern for Endogeneity.
Panel A: The results of H1 and H2 testing.
(1) – H1 testing DV: Invest Eq. (1) (2) – H2 testing DV: Over_Invest Eq. (3) (3) – H2 testing DV: Under_Invest Eq. (3)
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept −0.077*** −0.036*** 0.060***
(−5.67) (−4.31) (10.94)
Subsidy 2.423*** 0.530*** −0.455***
(5.65) (3.15) (−4.70)
Q 0.003*** 0.002** −0.001**
(3.00) (2.35) (−2.13)
Q_Subsidy −0.469*** ̶ ̶
(−3.15) ̶ ̶
All Variables in Main Test Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year & Industry fixed effects Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 9133 9133 9133
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.108 0.202
Panel B: The results of H3 testing.
DV: Invest (1) (2) (3) (4)
Less financially constrained
firms (SA < median) Eq. (1)
Highly financially
constrained firms (SA > =
median) Eq. (1)
Less financially constrained firms
(Altman Z score > median) Eq.
(1)
Highly financially constrained
firms (Altman Z score= <
median) Eq. (1)
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept −0.074*** −0.092*** −0.084*** −0.118***
(−4.08) (−4.09) (−3.89) (−5.70)
Subsidy 2.196*** 2.482*** 2.745*** 2.011**
(4.10) (3.41) (3.92) (2.16)
Q 0.004*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.010***
(2.87) (1.34) (2.63) (3.59)
Q_Subsidy −0.394** −0.431* −0.532*** −0.347
(−1.99) (−1.87) (−2.67) (−0.64)
All Variables in Main
Test
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year & Industry fixed
effects
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 4997 4136 4528 4605
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.248 0.234 0.272 0.272
Note: The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-
tailed test). Continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are in Table 1.
6 Political connections are measured as a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if the chairman or CEO has political ties, and 0 otherwise. Political
ties exist if (1) the chairman or CEO is a member of the National People's Congress (NPC), (2) the chairman or CEO is a member of the National
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or (3) either served as a government official in provincial, municipal
or county-level governments before they became the chairman or CEO in the listed firm.
7 STAFF is a proxy for government rent seeking in which the government forces connected firms to provide more job opportunities. It is measured
as the natural log of the number of employees. The rest of the variables are the same as those used in Eq. (1).
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(Lev), capita structure (Tangibl), the log of the number of years the firm has been listed (IPOage), excess returns (ARET) and prof-
itability (ROE). The Heckman second stage regression results based on Eq. (1) are reported in column (1) of Table 5 Panel A. Here,
one can see a negative estimated coefficient on Q_Subsidy. As reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 Panel A, the Heckman second
stage regressions using Eq. (3) with Over_Invest and Under_Invest as dependent variables show that subsidies have a positive effect on
over-investment but a negative effect on under-investment (Under_Invest). Panel B of Table 5 reports the results for the conditional
effect of subsidies on investment efficiency on financial constraints. The findings are in accordance with our main results.
Finally, we use PSM to address potential self-selection problems. The results are reported in Table 6. Using the PSM methodology
of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985), we match a group of firms who received subsidies (treatment group) with a group of firms
that did not receive subsidies (control group) based on their similar firm-level characteristics according to a function of covariates.
The results are based on matching done with a small calliper of 0.01 conducted without replacement.8 After conditioning on the
propensity score, we find no systematic differences in firm-level characteristics post-matching between treated and control subjects,
as reported in Panel A of Table 6. This indicates that the propensity score model has been correctly specified (Austin, 2011). The test
results using PSM matched samples are presented in Table 6 Panels B and C. Panel B column (1) shows a marginally negative
coefficient on Q_Subsidy, and columns (2) and (3) show a significantly positive (negative) coefficient on Subsidy when Over_Invest
Table 5
Heckman tests to alleviate concern for self-selection.
Panel A: The results of H1 and H2 testing.
(1) DV: Invest (2) DV: Over_Invest (3) DV: Under_Invest
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept 0.062*** 0.035** 0.011
(2.60) (2.10) (1.22)
Subsidy 0.977*** 0.343*** −0.195***
(5.20) (4.56) (−5.14)
Q 0.002*** 0.002** −0.001**
(3.22) (2.11) (−1.73)
Q_Subsidy −0.147** ̶ ̶
(−2.25) ̶ ̶
IMR −0.044*** −0.009* 0.017***
(−5.20) (−1.65) (5.08)
All Variables in Main Test Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year & Industry fixed effects Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 12,431 12,431 12,431
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.205 0.070 0.196
Panel B: The results of H3 testing.
DV: Invest (1) Less financially
constrained firms
(SA < median)
(2) Highly financially
constrained firms (SA > =
median)
(3) Less financially constrained
firms (Altman Z score > median)
(4) Highly financially
constrained firms (Altman Z
score= < median)
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept 0.056⁎ 0.036 0.043 0.044
(1.65) (1.08) (1.30) (1.42)
Subsidy 0.931⁎⁎⁎ 0.987*** 1.391*** 0.583*
(3.30) (3.87) (5.07) (1.73)
Q 0.002⁎⁎ 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006***
(2.43) (3.21) (3.06) (4.06)
Q_Subsidy −0.196⁎⁎ −0.075 −0.256*** 0.017
(−2.16) (−0.75) (−3.28) (0.09)
IMR −0.038⁎⁎⁎ −0.045*** −0.044*** −0.052***
(−3.17) (−3.99) (−3.73) (−4.52)
All Variables in Main
Test
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year & Industry fixed
effects
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 6215 6216 6215 6216
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.182 0.206 0.189 0.227
Note: The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-
tailed test). Continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are in Table 1.
8 We also try average treatment effect and nearest neighbour methods with various callipers, and the results are generally similar.
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(Under_Invest) are the dependent variables. In addition, Panel C reports that subsidies' negative effect on investment efficiency is more
pronounced in firms whose financial resources are less constrained when the Altman Z-score is used to measure the financial resource
constraints, as reported in columns (3) and (4). However, the coefficients on Q_Subsidy are insignificant for this analysis when SA is
used to measure the financial constraints, as reported in columns (1) and (2).
5. Conclusion
Corporate investment efficiency is essential to corporate profitability and ultimately contributes to industry- and country-level
Table 6
Tests using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique to alleviate concern for self-selection.
Panel A: Variable covariate matching pre and post-PSM.
Variables Sample with subsidy>0 Sample with subsidy= 0
N mean median sd N mean median sd DIFF tstats
Q 1231 2.441 1.949 1.492 1231 2.446 1.869 1.625 −0.005 −0.08
CFO 1231 0.050 0.048 0.076 1231 0.051 0.050 0.086 −0.001 0.32
SIZE 1231 21.502 21.438 1.024 1231 21.478 21.343 1.234 0.024 0.55
LEV 1231 0.478 0.488 0.174 1231 0.477 0.495 0.196 0.001 0.15
TANGIBL 1231 0.261 0.236 0.155 1231 0.268 0.235 0.202 −0.007 −1.02
IPOAGE 1231 11.200 11.342 4.751 1231 11.088 11.041 4.798 0.112 0.61
ARET 1231 0.025 −0.020 0.497 1231 0.023 −0.025 0.491 0.002 0.11
ROE 1231 0.071 0.067 0.095 1231 0.072 0.067 0.096 −0.001 −0.15
Panel B: The results of H1 and H2 testing using PSM matched samples.
(1) DV: Invest (2) DV: Over_Invest (3) DV: Under_Invest
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept −0.058* −0.017 0.086***
(−1.87) (−0.82) (6.45)
Subsidy 0.985** 0.512** −0.228*
(1.97) (2.34) (−1.89)
Q 0.003** 0.002** −0.001**
(2.32) (2.07) (−2.27)
Q_Subsidy −0.011* ̶ ̶
(−1.96) ̶ ̶
All Variables in Main Test Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year & Industry fixed effects Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 2462 2462 2462
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.249 0.093 0.289
Panel C: The results of H3 testing using PSM matched samples.
DV: Invest (1) Less financially
constrained firms
(SA < median)
(2) Highly financially
constrained firms (SA > =
median)
(3) Less financially constrained
firms (Altman Z score > median)
(4) Highly financially
constrained firms (Altman Z
score= < median)
Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
Intercept −0.054 −0.089* −0.012 −0.162***
(−1.13) (−1.75) (−0.24) (−3.38)
Subsidy 1.594** 0.118 1.325* 0.645
(2.40) (0.14) (1.73) (0.47)
Q 0.004** 0.002 0.001 0.013***
(2.27) (1.39) (0.92) (2.87)
Q_Subsidy −0.261 0.026 −0.302** 0.105
(−1.46) (0.11) (−2.05) (0.13)
All Variables in Main
Test
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year & Industry fixed
effects
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs. 1481 981 1137 1325
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.243 0.260 0.218 0.290
Note: The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-
tailed test). Continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are in Table 1.
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economic development. We find that government subsidies have an adverse effect on corporate investment efficiency. Our in-
vestigation further shows that this effect is driven by over-investment by firms that receive subsidies. However, subsidies do appear to
address under-investment problems in some recipients. Additionally, our analyses demonstrate that government subsidies reduce the
investment efficiency of less financially constrained firms, but do not reduce the investment efficiency of firms with greater levels of
financial constraints. This suggests that subsidies should be used with care, as they can result in improved investment efficiency when
the recipients have scarce financial resources, but may induce waste in firms that have easy access to financial resources. In general,
our findings point to the need for a careful choice of subsidy recipients. Government authorities granting subsidies need to more
closely monitor the utility of the subsidies to ensure investment efficiency and avoid wasteful resource allocation. Our findings have
implications for other countries where governments use subsidies as a means of economic management.
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